Determining Mental States for Narcotics Offenses under the Missouri Criminal Code by Carlstead, Edward P.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 49 
Issue 1 Winter 1984 Article 14 
Winter 1984 
Determining Mental States for Narcotics Offenses under the 
Missouri Criminal Code 
Edward P. Carlstead 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward P. Carlstead, Determining Mental States for Narcotics Offenses under the Missouri Criminal Code, 
49 MO. L. REV. (1984) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss1/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
DETERMINING MENTAL STATES
FOR NARCOTICS OFFENSES UNDER
THE MISSOURI CRIMINAL CODE
State v. Green'
Criminal statutes that do not expressly define requisite mental states for
the acts prohibited create problems in determining what the legislature in-
tended to proscribe. Tension exists between construing a statute as a strict
liability offense or reading a culpable mental state into it. A court may require
a mental state to avoid the harshness of punishing an apparently innocent act.
With narcotics offenses, however, courts are more willing to dispense with
mental culpability to protect the public welfare.
The Missouri Supreme Court has adopted a new method for construing
mental states for narcotics offenses. This approach tends to disregard histori-
cally developed methods of statutory construction in favor of the standard
adopted by the new Missouri Criminal Code (Code).' As interpreted by the
Green court, the Code standard limits the judicial role in construing criminal
statutes and creates uncertainty in interpreting strict liability narcotics
offenses.
Lawrence Green presented prescriptions for two controlled narcotics to a
pharmacist at a drug store in Independence, Missouri. The prescriptions were
issued in the name of Stephen Devore. The pharmacist became suspicious of
the requested quantity and discovered that the prescriptions had been falsi-
fied.3 Green was arrested and charged under Missouri Revised Statutes sec-
tions 195.170.14 and 195.2505 of the Missouri Uniform Controlled Substances
1. 629 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
2. 1977 Mo. Laws 662. The new Missouri Criminal Code (Code) is contained in Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 556.011-600.096 (1978 & Supp. 1983). The Committee for a Modern Criminal
Code submitted its final draft of a revised code for legislative approval in 1973. Thus the Code is
often referred to as the 1973 Missouri Criminal Code. See generally Houser, Sympo-
sium-Proposed Missouri Criminal Code-Introduction, 38 Mo. L. REV. 364 (1973).
3. The prescription authorized the dispensing of 90 tablets, which according to the phar-
macist, was an unusually large number of potent pain killers to be written on a hospital prescrip-
tion. The pharmacist also testified that the defendant acted nervously while in the pharmacy. 629
S.W.2d. at 327.
4. (1978). This section provides:
No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain a controlled substance or procure or at-
tempt to procure the administration of the controlled substance by fraud, deceit, mis-
representation, or subterfuge; or by the forgery or alteration of a prescription or of any
written order; or by the concealment of a material fact; or by the use of a false name or
the giving of a false address.
5. (1978). Section 195.250 contains similar prohibitions with regard to substances listed
in Schedules III, IV, and V. See notes 8-9 infra.
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Act (MUCSA) 6 with attempting to obtain controlled narcotics by the use of a
false name and address. At trial, Green testified that he was having the
prescriptions filled at the request of a friend, who had supplied him with the
prescriptions and Devore's identification cards. Green contended that he did
not know that the prescriptions had been falsified or that the identification
cards had been stolen.7
Green was found guilty of attempting to obtain a Schedule IP and a
Schedule IV9 controlled substance by fraud through the use of a false name
and address. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for each
count.10 On appeal, Green argued that the verdict directing instructions were
erroneous because they failed to require that the jury find that Green knew he
was using a false *name and prescription in attempting to obtain the drugs.,'
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed the convic-
tions and transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court.12 The supreme
court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.13 The court held that
although a mental state of knowledge is not expressly provided for in sections
195.170.1 and 195.250, the instructions were prejudicially erroneous for fail-
ing to submit to the jury the element of knowledge. 4
The supreme court was constrained to follow the construction provisions
of the Code, even though the offense of attempting to obtain a controlled sub-
stance by fraud is defined outside of the Code.' 5 The Code provides that "un-
less expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires," its provisions
shall govern the construction of non-Code offenses. 6 Thus, the court looked to
6. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 195.010-.320 (1978 & Supp. 1983). The basic criminal offense
under MUCSA consists of knowingly and intentionally possessing a substance, chemically defined
on a schedule of prohibited narcotics, without a specific authorization or exemption. See Richart
& Wampler, Missouri's New Drug Law: Chapter 195, 29 J. Mo. B. 305 (1973). An objective of
MUCSA was to establish a closed regulatory system for legitimate handlers of drugs to prevent
illicit drug traffic. See UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT introductory comment, 9 U.L.A.
187, 188 (1979). MUCSA prohibits the unauthorized manufacture, possession, control, sale, pre-
scription, administration, dispensing, distribution, and compounding of any controlled substance.
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (Supp. 1983).
7. The defendant testified that he did not become suspicious of the prescriptions because
he knew that his friend worked at the Truman Medical Center, where the prescriptions had been
written. 622 S.W.2d at 327.
8. Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.015.1 (1978) grants authority to the Division of Health to
place narcotic substances on schedules according to kind, effect, and abuse potential. Schedule II
lists substances with a high potential for abuse that can lead to severe psychic or physical depen-
dence. Id. §§ 195.017.3-.4.
9. Id. § 195.017.7-.8. Schedule IV contains substances with a low potential for abuse,
which may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence.
10. The jury fixed punishment at 1.5 years imprisonment for both counts. The trial court
found appellant to be a persistent offender under Mo. REV. STAT. § 558.016 (1978), and ex-
tended his sentence to 2.5 years on each count. 629 S.W.2d at 326.
11. 629 S.W.2d at 327. The instructions were patterned after Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-
CRIM. Nos. 32-10, 32-16 (2d ed. 1979).
12. 629 S.W.2d at 326.
13. Id. al 326, 329.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 328.
16. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.031.2 (1978). The court found that the offenses were defined
2
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section 562.021.217 of the Code, which states: "Except as provided in section
562.026 if the definition of an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable
mental state, a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established
if a person acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly, but criminal negligence
is not sufficient." Missouri Revised Statutes section 562.02618 exempts a
mental state requirement for infractions19 or where the statute defining the
offense "clearly indicates a purpose to dispense with the requirement." The
court stated that sections 195.170.1 and 195.250 do not indicate a purpose to
dispense with a culpable mental state20 and summarily concluded that a
mental state is required for the offense Green'was charged with committing.2
Green was the first opportunity for a Missouri appellate court to construe
the mental state for a narcotics offense according to the Code.22 Prior to the
adoption of the Code in 1977,23 Missouri criminal law contained a patchwork
of archaic definitions, proscriptions, and sanctions.2' Numerous terms were
utilized to describe culpable mental states for a wide variety of offenses.25
outside of the Code and were committed after January 1, 1979, the effective date of the Code.
Thus, the provisions of the Code govern the construction of §§ 195.170.1 and 195.250. 629
S.W.2d at 328. An example of a non-Code offense in which the statute itself, rather than the
Code, expressly provides for its own construction, is second degree murder, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.004 (1978) (all kinds of murder at common law other than first degree murder, manslaugh-
ter, and justifiable homicide are second degree murder). See State v. Mannon, 637 S.W.2d 674,
677-78 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (unnecessary to look to the Code to construe the elements of second
degree murder since the statute provides that second degree murder is defined by the common
law); see also State ex reL Egger v. Enright, 609 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (capital
murder is a non-Code offense).
17. (1978).
18. (1978).
19. An offense is an infraction if designated by the statute, or if only a fine or civil forfei-
ture is authorized. An infraction is not a crime and conviction does not give rise to any legal
disability or disadvantage associated with conviction of a crime. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.021
(1978). In Green, the court held that the offense was not an infraction. 629 S.W.2d at 328. Viola-
tions of any provision of MUCSA involve maximum penalties of 10-20 years imprisonment for the
first offense. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 195.200, .270 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
20. 629 S.W.2d at 328-29.
21. Id. at 329.
22. Prior to Green, mental states for only Code offenses had been construed according to
sections 556.031.2 and 562.021. See, e.g., State v. Saffold, 639 S.W.3d 243, 249 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (robbery), State v. Foster, 631 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (rape). For post-
Green decisions construing mental states for Code offenses, see State v. Rideau, 650 S.W.2d 675,
676-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (manslaughter); State v. Scott, 649 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Mo. Ct. App,
1983) (rape). In State v. Perkins, 650 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), the court applied
§ 562.021.2 to the offense of unlawfully selling a controlled narcotic, Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.020
(Supp. 1983), and summarily concluded that purpose, knowlege, or recklessness is an element of
the offense. The court did not refer to Green. 650 S.W.2d at 341.
The Green court could have escaped the problem of trying to apply a single standard of
statutory interpretation to MUCSA offenses by holding that the Code does not govern the con-
struction of MUCSA offenses. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.031.2 (1978) states that the Code does not
control the construction of non-Code offenses where the "context" of the statute "otherwise re-
quires." While it is not clear what offenses are excluded by § 556.031.2, it could be argued that
MUCSA offenses must be construed in light of the Act's unique prohibitory and regulatory
purposes.
23. See note 2 supra.
24. See Houser, supra note 2, at 365.
25. Id.; see, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 557.010 (1969) (repealed 1977) (perjury) ("willfully
3
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These terms varied from statute to statute, and dozens of judicial decisions
were often required to determine their meanings." Other statutes did not men-
tion mental states and raised uncertainties as to whether the mere perform-
ance of the act proscribed constituted an offense.17
The Code was designed to simplify the construction of mens rea require-
ments by adopting requisite mental states similar those found in the Model
Penal Code.28 For the accused to be found guility of an offense under the
Code, he must have acted with purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or criminal
negligence .2 Many Code offenses expressly incorporate these mental states.30
Where the statute does not mention a culpable mental state, the Code requires
purpose, knowledge, or recklessness.31 Recent Missouri cases have applied the
mental state requirements of Missouri Revised Statutes section 562.01632 liter-
ally when interpreting Code offenses that do not expressly describe a mental
state.33 Prior to Green, however, there were no cases applying section 562.016
to non-Code narcotics offenses."
Green represents a shift in Missouri law regarding mental states required
for narcotics offenses. Case law prior to the adoption of the Code interpreted
and corruptly"); id. § 559.010 (murder) ("willful, deliberate and premeditated"); id. § 559.200
(mayhem) ("on purpose and of malice aforethought").
26. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.021 comment (Vernon 1979).
27. See Houser, supra note 2, at 365.
28. Mental states in the Code are based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 4-3 to 4-9 (1969); and N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 15.00, 15.05
(McKinney 1965). Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.016 comment (Vernon 1979).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016 (1978) provides:
2. A person "acts purposely", or with purpose, with respect to his conduct or to
a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in the conduct or to cause that
result.
3. A person "acts knowingly", or with knowledge,
(1) With respect to his conduct or to attendant circumstances when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or that those circumstances exist; or
(2) With respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to cause that result.
4. A person "acts recklessly", or is reckless when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist that a result will follow, and
such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasona-
ble person would exercise in the situation.
5. A person "acts with criminal negligence" or is criminally negligent when he
fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a
result will follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
case which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
30. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 565.050.1(1), .060.1(1)-(2), .070.1(1)-(5), 569.040.1,
.060.1, .065.1 (1978).
31. Id. § 562.021.2.
32. (1978); see note 29 supra.
33. See note 22 supra. In State v. Foster, 631 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), the
defendant unsuccessfully challenged a rape conviction, contending that the jury should have been
required to find that he acted knowingly, rather than recklessly, with regard to victim's lack of
consent. The statute did not define the required mental state for consent. The court held that
§ 562.021.2 controls the construction of the offense statute and therefore recklessly is a sufficient
mental state for consent. Id. at 675-76.
34. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.016 notes (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1984).
4
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many MUCSA offenses as not requiring culpable mental states.35 Green re-
quires a mental state for at least one of these offenses, the fraudulent procure-
ment of a controlled substance. 8 Although the court did not explain the rea-
sons for this shift, it considered the result to be mandated by the Code,37
rather than by any fundamental change in the reasons that originally led to
MUCSA offenses being classed as strict liability crimes.3"
Cases construing narcotics offense statutes prior to the adoption of the
Code demonstrate how Green changes the law. Missouri courts'had construed
mental state requirements for narcotics offenses by utilizing the test set out in
City of St. Louis v. Williams."9 Williams involved a charge of displaying an
obscene magazine with the intent to sell it to minors. Williams, an employee in
a St. Louis drug store, was arrested after selling an obscene magazine. The
defendant contended that she knew nothing of the contents of the magazine as
it had just been delivered. The city ordinance, 40 which made it unlawful to
exhibit and sell obscene literature to minors, defined no required mental state
regarding the contents of the literature.1 In determining whether a mental
state was required, the Williams court considered two factors: the language of
the ordinance, and the subject matter and purpose of the prohibition.42 The
court concluded that scienter was not intended to be part of the offense.43
The Williams court stated that the common law rule requiring mens rea
35. State v. Napolis, 436 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Mo. 1969) (sale); State v. Darabcsek, 412
S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. 1967) (possession); State v. Page, 395 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. 1965) (sale);
State v. Rivers, 554 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (distribution). The major exception to
not requiring culpable mental states for narcotics offenses is unlawful possession. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 195.020 (1978 & Supp. 1983). The defendant must know of the presence and character
of'the substance within his control. See State v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281, 292 (Mo. 1975) (en
banc); State v. Burns, 457 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Mo. 1970); State v. Young, 427 S.W.2d 510, 513
(Mo. 1968). In other jurisdictions, the possession of narcotics is considered such a hazard that the
courts have held the unauthorized possession of narcotics to be a strict liability offense. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 77, 137 A.2d 115, 118 (1957) (not necessary to allege scienter
unless required by statute); Commonwealth v. Lee, 331 Mass. 166, 168, 117 N.E.2d 830, 832
(1954) (burden on actor to ascertain whether possession is prohibited); State v. Haines, 74 Wash.
2d 721, 724, 446 P.2d 344, 346 (1968) (intent to possess not a necessary element).
36. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 195.170.1, .250 (1978).
37. The Green court decided that the Code, rather than the context of MUCSA, controls
the construction of MUCSA offenses. 629 S.W.2d at 328. Apparently, the court of appeals had
concluded that knowledge was required for the fraudulent procurement of narcotics by analogiz-
ing §§ 195.170.1 and 195.250 to § 195.020, which requires scienter for unlawful possession. The
supreme court found the reasoning persuasive but indicated "that the answer lies" in the Code.
629 S.W.2d at 328.
38. See text accompanying notes 69-77 infra.
39. 343 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1961).
40. ST. Louis ORDINANCE No. 47516, § 2 (1955) (repealed 1962), made it unlawful to
"sell, exhibit, give away, distribute, keep in ... possession with intent to sell or give away, or in
any way furnish or attempt to furnish to any minor, any picture, comic book, magazine or other
publication which is of an obscene or indecent nature."
41. Although the ordinance included the element of intent, the court held that this referred
solely to the purpose of possessing the literature and not to the defendant's knowledge of its con-
tents. 343 S.W.2d at 19.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 20.
5
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as an element of a criminal offense44 has no application where the legislature
intends to dispense with a mental state for a particular offense. 5 Since the
ordinance did not expressly prescribe a mental state, and because cases at the
time the ordinance was enacted had not considered scienter an element for
similar offenses,46 the court refused to read a scienter element into the ordi-
nance. The court viewed the common law rule requiring mental states as
merely a rule of "implication." 4 Thus, if a mental state is not indicated in a
statute, a court should not imply a mental state merely because of the com-
mon law rule.4
The Williams test was first applied to a narcotics statute in State v.
Page,49 which involved a conviction for the unlawful sale of marijuana. The
statute contained no requirement that the accused know that the item sold was
a narcotic.50 The court observed that the United States Supreme Court had
held that the elimination of knowledge as an element is a proper exercise of
legislative discretion with respect to laws prohibiting the sale of narcotics."
The Page court concluded that the justification for making the sale of narcot-
ics a strict liability offense was the state's interest in maintaining public health
and welfare.52
In State v. Napolis,53 the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the reasoning
of Page to expand (he catagories of drug offenses that do not require cupable
mental states. Although Napolis, like Page, involved a conviction for the sale
of narcotics, 54 in dicta the court stated: "The State has the same right, in the
exercise of its police power, to prohibit possession, sale, distribution, or trans-
fer of barbiturates and stimulant drugs . . . and it is not necessary that the
legislature make knowledge or criminal intent an element of the offense.""
State v. Gordon5" later held that Page and Napolis, which were decided under
44. See State v. Hefflin, 38 Mo. 236, 249, 89 S.W.2d 938, 946 (1936).
45. 343 S.W.2d at 19.
46. See People v. Shapiro, 6 A.D.2d 271, 274, 177 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Havens, 6 Pa. C. 545 (1887).
47. 343 S.W.2d at 20. But see Gasser v. Morgan, 498 F. Supp. 1154, 1161 (N.D. Ala.
1980) ("with statutory crimes scienter may be implied if a court finds that it was the intent of the
legislature to require such" even if the offense was not a common law crime).
48. Ultimately, the court found that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Based on Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the court held that by dispensing with any requirement of the
seller's knowledge of the contents, the ordinance tended to impose a severe limitation on the pub-
lic's access to constitutionally protected literature. 343 S.W.2d at 22.
49. 395 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1965).
50. Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (1959) (amended 1982).
51. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
52. 395 S.W.2d at 149 (wrongful sale of narcotics so adversely affects public welfare as to
justify a state to "prohibit all sales thereof, except as specifically authorized, and to place on all
persons the responsibility to see that they do not sell narcotics unlawfully").
53. 436 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1969). Napolis was one of four cases containing language ex-
pressly overruled in Green. See 629 S.W.2d at 329.
54. The statute construed in Napolis was Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.240 (1959) (repealed
1977), which made unlawful the possession, sale, distribution, or transfer of barbiturates or stimu-
lants. The statute did not expressly define a culpable mental state.
55. 436 S.W.2d at 647.
56. 536 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Gordon was overruled by Green. See 629
19841
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the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,5 were applicable to MUCSA.05
The pre-Green approach gave deference to the court's determination of
legislative intent if a statute did not.expressly provide for a mental state. Fac-
tors considered in determining legislative intent were: the language of the stat-
ute;59 the subject matter of the offense;60 the case law at the time the statute
was enacted;61 the need for effective law enforcement;6 2 and public health and
safety policies.6 3 Green makes the Code, rather than the nature and purpose of
the statute, the primary emphasis in construing MUSCA offenses. The Code
approach requires that a mental state be read into the statute even though the
statute is silent as to that element.64 While the former approach considered the
underlying purpose and policy of the statute as central to determining whether
the legislature intended to exclude a mental state, the Code relegates such
considerations to an exception. Under the Code, a culpable mental state is
required unless the statute defining the offense "clearly indicates a purpose to
dispense with the requirement. '65 Unfortunately, neither Green nor the Code
defines what "clearly indicates" a purpose to dispense with a culpable mental
state.66
S.W.2d at 329.
57. Missouri drug laws prior to MUCSA were patterned after the UNIF. NARCOTIC DRUC
Acr (1932), 9B U.L.A. 409 (1966).
58. 536 S.W.2d at 818.
59. See State v. St. John, 544 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State v. Napolis, 436
S.W.2d 645, 648 (Mo. 1969); State v. Darabesek, 412 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. 1967).
60. See Napolis, 436 S.W.2d at 647; State v. Page, 395 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. 1965);
Gordon, 536 S.W.2d at 818.
61. See Napolis, 436 S.W.2d at 647; State v. Rivers, 554 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); Holden, 548 S.W.2d at 195; Gordon, 536 S.W.2d at 817.
62. See Page, 395 S.W.2d at 149; see also United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437,
438 (3d Cir. 1943); City of Hays v. Schueler, 107 Kan. 635, 193 P. 311 (1920); 21 AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 139 (1981).
63. See Napolis, 436 S.W.2d at 647; Page, 395 S.W.2d at 149; Gordon, 536 S.W.2d at
817. Courts consider five factors in deciding whether a particular statute is to be construed as a
strict liability criminal offense: (1) the legislative history, e.g., State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 250
N.W. 702 (1933) (legislature that removed "knowingly" from statute intended to create a strict
liability offense); (2) the severity of the punishment (the greater the penalty the less likely the
legislature intended to do away with a mental state); (3) the seriousness of the harm to the public;(4) the ease with which the defendant could ascertain the truth regarding the proscribed activity
(the easier it is to discover the truth, the more likely the legislature intended strict liability); and(5) the expected frequency of prosecutions (the more frequently the legislature expected the state
to prosecute the offense, the less likely the legislature intended the state to have to prove a mental
state). W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 219-20 (1972).
64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.021.2 (1978).
65. Id. § 562.026.2.
66. The comment to section 562.026.2 states that this "permits doing away with the re-
quirement of a mental state as to an element of a 'true crime,'" but does not define a "true
crime." The comment predicts, however, that "there will be very few instances of such criminal
liability without fault." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.026 comment (Vernon 1979). In a post-Green
decision, State v. Beishir, 646 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), the court concluded that the
statute defining the crime of sodomy (deviate sexual intercourse with a person under 14 years of
age, Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.060.1(2) (1978)) clearly indicated a purpose to dispense with the
requirement of any culpable mental state. Finding that no mental state was prescribed in the
statute, the court considered what it felt was the "absurdity" of requiring a voluntary act of
sexual intercourse to be committed purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. Thus, the court looked to
7
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Green expressly overruled earlier cases that had held that mental states
were not required for certain narcotics offenses.67 This heavy emphasis on a
mental state requirement, however, seems inconsistent with the purpose of
MUCSA, particularly since the trend in Missouri was to expand the number
of narcotics offenses that required no mental state.68
The Green court believed that the elimination of a mental state require-
ment for the narcotics offenses involved in the old cases was based solely on
the fact that there was no affirmative statement by the legislature that a
mental state was required. 9 This conclusion is incorrect. The Napolis court
premised its holding on the policy that the adverse effects of unregulated drug
trafficking justifies strict liability narcotics offenses.70 In light of this policy
and the absence of a mental state in the statute, Napolis held that "the lan-
guage of [section] 195.240 indicates a legislative intent not to require such
knowledge or criminal intent." 7' 1 Other cases overruled by Green used the
same reasoning.72 By ignoring the policy bases of these earlier holdings, Green
extended a mental state requirement to offenses which had been determined to
be strict liability criminal offenses.73 The Green approach places too much em-
phasis on literally applying the Code, severely limiting the importance of pub-
lic policy in construing narcotics statutes.
Green creates uncertainty regarding all strict liability narcotics offenses,
since the decision was not limited to the crime of attempting to obtain con-
trolled narcotics by fraud.74 The court overruled holdings which had elimi-
nated mental states for the unlawful sale and distribution of narcotics. 75 If it
had restricted its holding to sections 195.170.1 and 195.250, the court could
have pointed out that the fraudulent nature of the offense required knowledge
as a mental state.76 Thus, the court could have stated that policy considera-
tions demonstrated a clear legislative intent to require no mental state for the
unlawful sale and distribution of narcotics. If the court had been confronted
directly with construing a mental state for unlawful sale and distribution, it
probably would have taken policy into consideration in determining whether
cases decided before the adoption of the Code and found that a mental state was not an element
the offense. 646 S.W.2d at 77.
67. 629 S.W.2d at 329.
68. See State v. Napolis, 436 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Mo. 1969); text accompanying notes 53-
58 supra.
69. 629 S.W.2d at 329.
70. 436 S.W.2d at 647.
71. Id. at 648.
72. See State v. St. John, 544 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State v. Gordon, 536
S.W.2d 811, 817-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
73. For discussion of strict liability criminal offenses, see text accompanying notes 78-93
infra.
74. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 195.170.1, .250 (1978).
75. 629 S.W.2d at 329; see State v. Napolis, 436 S.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Mo. 1969) (sale);
State v. Gordon, 536 S.W.2d 811, 817-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (distribution).
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these offenses have requisite mental states.7 Thus, it remains to be explored
how Missouri courts can hold that certain MUCSA statutes can still be con-
strued as strict liability offenses.
Strict liability criminal offenses are an exception to the common law rule
that a culpable mental state is a necessary element of a criminal offense. 78 The
common law rationale is that criminal penalties are not justifiable for those
who unintentionally cause harm.79 Before a statute is construed as eliminating
a mental state, the intent of the legislature must be clear.80
A legislative intent to dispense with a mental state requirement often is
found in regulatory offenses.81 Regulatory offenses are usually enacted to pun-
ish acts capable of inflicting widespread injury or endangering public welfare,
where proving the offender's mental state would hinder effective enforcement
of the prohibition.2 In Morissette v. United States,83 the United States Su-
preme Court distinguished strict liability regulatory offenses from most com-
mon law crimes.8 ' The Court noted that the Industrial Revolution had
prompted an increase in government regulation of industries and trades.80 To
make these regulations more effective, lawmakers eventually assigned criminal
penalties to violations of some of the regulations.8 The resulting class of
crimes did not fit neatly into any of the accepted classifications of common law
offenses.87 The chief distinction shared by these regulatory offenses was the
elimination of a criminal mental state as an element of the offense.88 The need
to forbid certain publicly harmful actions justified eliminating the mental state
element.8 9 Criminal penalties served to induce compliance, rather than to pun-
77. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
78. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); State v. Hefflin, 338 Mo. 236,
249, 89 S.W.2d 938, 946 (1936). While ordinarily a criminal intent must exist to support a con-
viction, the legislature may enact a law making certain conduct a crime in the absence of criminal
intent. Such a law is malum prohibitum, and merely doing the prohibited act constitutes the
crime. Fitzpatrick v. Board of Medical Examiners, 96 Ariz. 309, 315, 394 P.2d 423, 427 (1964);
see also State v. McLarty, 414 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. 1967). While it is a permissible exercise of
the police power to enact strict liability criminal statutes, punishment without proof of a voluntary
act or omission (actus reus) is generally unconstitutional. E.g., People v. Belcastro, 356 Il1. 144,
148, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934) ("With mere guilty intention, divorced from an overt act or out-
ward manifestation thereof, the law does not concern itself."); see also Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (criminal punishment for status of narcotic addiction violates the
eighth amendment).
79. See, e.g., State v. Lisbon Book Sales Co., 21 Ohio Op. 2d 455, 457, 182 N.E.2d 641,
644 (Com. P1. 1961); see also A. LoEwY, CRIMINAL LAW 115 (1975).
80. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922); People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d
167, 173, 302 P.2d 5, 9 (1956); State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 524, 118 P.2d 280, 286 (1941).
81. See Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952); United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943); United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir.
1979).
82. 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 139 (1979).
83. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
84. Id. at 252.
85. Id. at 254.
86. Id. at 255.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 256.
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ish deviant behavior.90 Penalties for regulatory offenses commonly are small,
and conviction does no grave damage to the offender's reputation.91
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal narcotics statutes may be
construed as strict liability offenses.92 Since MUCSA was patterned after the
federal narcotics statutes93 and was enacted primarily to control the harmful
effects of narcotics, no criminal mental state should be required for most
MUCSA offenses.
Sections 195.170.1 and 195.250 cannot be readily classified as either com-
mon law offenses (requiring a mental state) or purely regulatory offenses (jus-
tifying the elimination of a mental state).94 Both sections deal with obtaining
or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud or the use of a false
name. The offenses are regulatory in that they are part of the MUCSA
scheme. Obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, however, is similar to a
common law crime in at least two respects. First, fraud is a classic common
law crime, which requires a willful and knowledgeable misrepresentation. 95
Second, the offense is a felony,99 which is uncommon for purely regulatory
offenses07 and demonstrates a purpose to punish deviant behavior. A heavy
penalty is usually associated with a criminal offense rather than a regulatory
offense.98 Nevertheless, the importance of regulating narcotics has been held
to justify the imposition of criminal penalties.99 Thus, attempting to procure a
90. Id. at 258-59. Imposing heavy sentences for narcotics offenses often raises the constitu-
tional issue of proportionality. See generally Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth
Amendment: New York's 1973 Drug Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1975); Note, Do the Sentencing Provisions of the New
York Drug Laws Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?-People v. Broadie, 25 DE PAUL L.
REV. 193 (1975).
91. 342 U.S. at 256; see generally Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV.
905 (1939); Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 832 (1952); Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
92. See United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
93. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-965 (1982).
94. The Uniform Controlled Substances Act segregates fraud dealing with the manufac-
ture and distribution of narcotics from other narcotics regulations. The drafters pointed to the
adverse effect of fraud on the integrity of the drug regulatory system to justify criminalizing it
independent of the drug involved. See UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE Acr § 403 comment
(1970), 9 U.L.A. 495-96 (1979). Section 403 of the Act includes the mental states of "knowingly
or intentionally" for fraud offenses. When Missouri adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, it apparently opted for the former reading of the statute, which did not contain mental states,
based on the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.170 (1969) (repealed
1977); note 57 supra.
95. The elements of fraud are: a material representation, its falsity, the speaker's knowl-
edge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, the intent that the representation should be acted upon
by the hearer in a manner reasonably contemplated, the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, his reli-
ance and right to rely thereon, and a consequent injury. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3 (1943); see also
Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
96. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 195.200, .270 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
97. See Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1942).
98. Id.
99. See State v. Page, 395 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. 1965); see also United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
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regulated substance is made a criminal act only when perpetrated by fraud.
Yet the fraud is made culpable only because the substance obtained is regu-
lated. 100 The absence of either element seems to remove the act from the
realm of criminality. 10 1
The Green court reached a just result. The purpose of the statute is to
prevent willful falsification of prescriptions.10 2 Fraud is included as an element
of the statute to prevent persons who may otherwise lawfully procure drugs
from obtaining them by misrepresentation.1 0 3 Persons who innocently use
forged prescriptions or false names should not be held criminally liable.10' By
100. See, e.g., People v. One 1962 Chevrolet Bel Air, 248 Cal. App. 2d 725, 56 Cal. Rptr.
878 (1962) (defendant gave false name when purchasing cough syrup containing codeine, for
which no prescription was required; found not guilty because mere possession was not unlawful).
101. There is a difference between knowledge of the falsity of a prescription and knowledge
that the narcotic obtained is a controlled substance. Green indicates that all the acts proscribed in
§§ 195.170.1 and 195.250 must be performed purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. 629 S.W.2d at
329. This holding is consistent with Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.021.1. (1978) (prescribed mental state
applies to each material element of an offense unless otherwise specified). Although no mental
state is specifically prescribed in §§ 195.170.1 and 195.250, it is probable that fraud presumes the
mental state of knowledge. See note 95 supra. Thus, pursuant to § 562.021.1, it could be argued
that the defendant must also have knowledge of the nature or character of the drug obtained
(similar to the mental element required for possession of controlled narcotics), in addition to
knowledge that the prescription was false. See note 35 supra.
102. See, e.g., State v. St. John, 544 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo. 1976) (en bane) ("[The] purpose of
§ 195.250 is not to control the defrauding or deceit of druggists or pharmacists but rather to
prohibit the misuse of narcotic drugs."); see also State v. McFall, 5 Ariz. App. 539, 546, 428 P.2d
1013, 1020 (1967) (purpose of statute prohibiting obtaining a narcotic with a forged prescription
was not to protect the druggist, but to prevent misuse of drugs), vacated on other grounds, 103
Ariz. 234, 439 P.2d 805 (1968) (en banc); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1979)
(purpose of drug statute held to regulate narcotics and prevent procurement by falsification,
whereas criminal code fraud designed to prohibit alteration of documents for purpose of de-
frauding another).
103. Manufacturers, pharmacists, and doctors may lawfully procure controlled substances.
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.050 (1978). Any person presenting a proper prescription may obtain a
controlled substance. See id. § 195.060. A "good faith" requirement protects dispensers from
liability for delivering controlled substances to non-qualified persons. See id. §§ 195.060, .070.
104. It has been suggested that the violation of a regulatory offense by an innocent act will
not justify a conviction where the injustice outweighs the danger created by not making the activ-
ity the subject of the regulation. United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A]
person should not be punished for a crime unless they [sic] . . . intended to commit a crime.").
The importance of distinguishing between an innocent and a criminal breach of a MUCSA of-
fense can be noted by comparing State v. Gordon, 536 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) with
State v. Rivers, 554 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). Both cases involved prosecutions for un-
lawful distribution of a controlled narcotic. In Gordon, the defendant attempted to rid himself of
narcotics to avoid difficulties with approaching police. The court (relying on Page and Napolls)
held that § 195.020 does not require intent to distribute, and that the defendant's distribution of a
controlled substance was sufficient for conviction. 536 S.W.2d at 818. In Rivers, the defendant
was asked by a bartender to pass a cigarette to a customer. The defendant was unaware that the
cigarette contained marijuana. The court held that under § 195.020 the state was required to
prove that defendant had knowledge of the nature of the substance and intent to distribute the
substance. The court based its holding on State v. Bums, 457 S.W.2d 752, 752 (Mo. 1970) and
State v. Young, 427 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Mo. 1968), which held that possesory intent and
knowledge of the nature of the substance were elements of the offense of possession of a controlled
substance.
The Rivers court analogized possession to distribution and held that knowledge and intent to
distribute are essential elements of the offense. 554 S.W.2d at 551. Since the prosecutions in
Gordon and Rivers involved the same offense, the contrary holdings can only be explained'by
[Vol. 49
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making fraud an element of sections 195.170.1 and 195.250, the legislature
intended to punish those who decieve to make it appear that they are lawfully
obtaining drugs.
The Green court could not have construed the procurement of a narcotic
by fraud as a strict liability offense without facing the illogic of concluding
that the fraud did not require a knowledgeable misrepresentation.10 5 Prior
Missouri cases construing narcotics offenses had not dealt with fraud.106 They
dealt with the unlawful possession, sale, or distribution of narcotics-actions
which are unlawful because of the nature of the substances involved.107 It was
these actions that the MUCSA drafters intended to control, not the state of
mind to carry out the actions. °10 For attempting to obtain a narcotic by fraud,
however, the legislature desired to control the intent to do unlawfully what one
may, with the proper prescription, do lawfully. 0 9 One may only commit a
fraud if he knows he is making a false misrepresentation." 0 Thus, by including
distinguishing the facts. Rivers acted as an innocent intermediary, whereas Gordon passed along
the drugs in an attempt to avoid arrest. Since the elimination of mental states from regulatory
offenses is justified primarily to control particular persons, industries, and activities, Rivers' con-
duct fell outside that which MUCSA was purported to control. See also State v. Scarborough,
170 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (innocent person passing forged prescription in
good faith cannot be held criminally liable).
Green could not have escaped liability under the doctrine that the innocent agent of a pur-
chaser of contraband is not liable as a seller of the contraband to his principal. The procuring
agent defense has been rejected in Missouri. See State v. Perkins, 650 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); State v. Miles, 599 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Federal courts reject the
defense on the grounds that federal law requires the element of participation in the narcotics
transaction as a whole. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1978). Some
states, however, still recognize the procuring agent defense. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169,
174 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 456-57, 253 N.E.2d
346, 349 (1969); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428, 429, 260 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (1965), appeal
dismissed, 17 N.Y.2d 583, 215 N.E.2d 519 (1966); Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1965). Others have limited it to prosecutions involving the unlawful sale of contra-
band. See, e.g., Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Dixon v. State, 94
Nev. 662, 664, 584 P.2d 693, 694 (1978); Note, A Procuring Agent May Not be Convicted of
Narcotics Sale, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 272, 280 (1974). The defense has not been extended to
fraudulent procurement of narcotics.
105. In State v. St. John, 544 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), the court faced the paradox
of deciding whether a conviction for obtaining a controlled substance by fraud was possible where
there was no victim who relied upon the misrepresentation. The court concluded that reliance was
not a necessary element of the fraud in § 195.250. Id. at 8. Though reliance may be dispensed
with when there is no victim, knowledge of the falsity of the representation is essential to make
the act of misrepresentation a criminal offense.
106. See note 35 supra.
107. Where the substance obtained is not within the definition of prohibited narcotics or
other specified classes of drugs made the subject of a criminal offense by statute, no offense is
committed. 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 161a (1974).
108. See Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952); State v. St. John, 544
S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
109. Obtaining a narcotic by fraud is an element of the offense of attempting to fraudu-
lently procure a narcotic. See State v. Blea, 20 Utah 2d 133, 137, 434 P.2d 446, 449 (1967).
110. Knowledge that the prescription or order used to obtain the narcotic was forged is an
essential element of the offense of obtaining a narcotic by means of a false prescription. See State
v. McFall, 5 Ariz. App. 539, 545, 428 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1967), vacated on other grounds, 103
Ariz. 234, 439 P.2d 805 (1968) (en banc); Morrison v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 114, 115
(Ky. 1980).
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the words "fraud" or "false" in sections 195.170.1 and 195.250, the legislature
intended the offense of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud to include
the element of knowledge of the fraud on the part of the violator.111
The Green court should have recognized that the common law nature of
sections 195.170.1 and 195.250 required a culpable mental state. This nature
distinguishes these statutes from the strict liability regulatory sections of
MUCSA.112 If the court had drawn this distinction, it could have left intact
previous cases which properly interpreted other sections of the MUCSA as
strict liability regulatory offenses. Green unnecessarily expands the Code to
require mental states for offenses which clearly indicate a legislative intent
that no such element be required. Missouri courts, therefore, will have to pen-
etrate the reasoning of Green to reveal this distinction if they desire to pre-
serve the strict liability nature of other MUCSA criminal offense statutes.
The necessity of making this distinction, however, will not occur until a
court must construe a mental state requirement for a MUCSA offense that
was considered a strict liability crime prior to Green. A court will then have to
consider how to limit the scope of Green because of the importance of main-
taining the strict liability nature of most regulatory narcotics offenses. The
best approach would be to distinguish the common law crime elements of the
Green offense from the purely regulatory nature of other MUCSA offenses.
This would limit Green to violations of sections 195.170.1 and 195.350, leaving
courts to continue treating other MUCSA offenses as strict liability crimes.
The Green court took a step in this direction when it stated that the cases it
was overruling could no longer be followed where the elimination of a mental
state was based solely upon the absence of an affirmative statement by the
legislature that one was required.113 These past cases in fact eliminated mental
states because of strong public policy considerations, in addition to the absence
of express mental states in the offense statutes. Thus, Green can be limited as
objecting only to holdings that do not require mental states for criminal of-
fenses simply because the statute does not describe one. By emphasizing the
111. The word "false" has two distinct meanings: intentionally, knowingly, or negligently
untrue; or untrue by mistake, accident, or honesty after the exercise of reasonable care. See Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 37 A.2d 345, 350 (D.C. 1944). "False" in a criminal statute
usually implies a knowing and willful intent to deceive. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d
1280, 1286 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976); Lanier v. State, 448 P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska 1968); Laughlin v.
Bon Air Hotel Inc., 85 Ga. App. 43, 46, 68 S.E.2d 186, 189 (1951). Courts construing statutes
dealing with false statements have generally held that knowledge of the falsity of the statement is
implicit in the word "false." See Heindel v. United States, 150 F.2d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1945);
Wilensky v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 67 F.2d 389, 390 (1st Cir. 1933); Gilpin v. Merchant's
Nat'l Bank, 165 F. 607, 611 (3d Cir. 1908); McBride v. People, 126 Colo. 277, 282, 248 P.2d
715, 728 (1952) (en banc); see also State v. Scarborough, 170 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (in a prosecution for obtaining a narcotic by fraud or deceit, "[k]nowledge or scienter
is implicit in the language of the statute and thus ... does not have to be alleged separately").
112. Where a statute codifies a common law offense, the mental state required at common
law remains an element if the statute does not specifically eliminate it. 21 Am. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 139 (1981); see State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 519, 118 P.2d 280, 285 (1941); Masters
v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 350, 354 (1914).
113. 629 S.W.2d at 329; see Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.026(2) (1978).
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policy necessities for eliminating mental states from some MUCSA offenses, a
court can deal honestly with Green and the Code by demonstrating that other
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